As has been posted, Fusion Centers have shown a significant reflection of the growth of collaborative partnerships so vital in the team approach to counterterrorism. Over the past several years, these centers have developed across the country and, as any new construct, have had positives and negatives associated with them.

 Overall, as they have been analyzed as to their effectiveness in protecting the homeland, their role as a catalyst for having more conversation between Federal authorities and locals may be their greatest asset. As was mentioned this week by former Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis Charles E. Allen in the Heritage Foundation’s Homeland Security University, the answer is not in Washington. He praised the work of partnership that is occurring within the centers.

 Identifying best practices in Fusion Centers as tools is a maturing process as Secretary Napolitano has pointed out in her address to the third annual National Fusion Center conference that " I meant what I said. Fusion Centers to me are going to be key in how we increase our ability to protect the homeland." (http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/sp_1236975404263.shtm)

It seems with this robust movement and support, that DHS must continue to evaluate best practices and movement towards evaluation/standardization by advocating such guidance documents as DOJ’s Fusion Center Guidelines.

Secretary Napolitano has also provided testimony to Congress of the maturing process of Fusion Centers and the support the Administration is giving to them. Her announcement of such things as deployment of 41 intelligence officers to fusion centers and the future deployment of 70 more by the end of fiscal year 2010 and announcing the re-alignment of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) to include a Joint Fusion Center Program Management Office (JFC-PMO) show movement in the right direction. Other information sharing tools such the Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program Resource Center on LLIS.gov are great movements forward as the Fusion Center process matures.

The Congressional Research Service provided many options to Congress in its Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress from January 18, 2008. I would recommend that DHS leaders continue to mature the Fusion Center process by reviewing what has been delivered to Congress in this report and leverage those that have strong capability of becoming legislation and provided continual testimony to that end.

As has been pointed out by Eric Rosenbach in his memo "State and Local Fusion Centers" in Confrotation or Collaboration: Congress and the Intelligence Community (http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19164/state_and_local_fusion_centers.html)

Importance of Information Sharing

Fusion centers may be useful conduits for information, as state and local law enforcement officers are often the last line of defense against terrorist activity and attacks:

• Timothy McVeigh was arrested for the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building when an Oklahoma state trooper pulled him over for driving a vehicle without a license plate.
• The so-called Olympic Park Bomber, Eric Robert Rudolph, was only apprehended after a local police officer in North Carolina arrested him on an unrelated charge.
• Missed opportunity: Ziad Jarrah, one of the 9/11 hijackers, was pulled over by a Maryland state trooper two days before the attacks. The trooper was unable to identify the CIA-watchlisted Jarrah because he and the FBI did not have access to the CIA list.

As has been pointed out by so many - counterterrorism is a team effort and DHS should continue to leveage existing and future programs with this framework in mind.