Fact Sheet: The Border Wall versus True Homeland Security

Josiah Heyman, Ph.D.[i] jheyman@elp.rr.com

Due to space constraints, endnotes to source material have been moved to the next screen.  Thank you for considering this.

(1) The expensive and ineffective border wall comes at the cost of more appropriate investments in homeland security.

(a) According to the GAO and the RAND corporation, the DHS needs to take a comprehensive “risk management” approach to investments in security programs.[i]

A risk management approach includes consideration of multiple threats and diverse responses to them, rather than the way that the border wall has frozen large present and future expenditures in a low threat region (the southwest border).[ii]

(b) Immigration-oriented enforcement measures on the southwestern border rank low in a comprehensive risk assessment framework.

In a comprehensive poll of border security experts (the Terrorism Index), only 6% listed a border fence as one of two top priorities, as compared to 70% for port and cargo security, for example.[iii]

There was no connection whatsoever of the Mexican border to extreme Islamist terrorists and terrorist activities, according to a comprehensive database, while a number of threats were documented in connection to Canada and Europe.[iv]

Susan Ginsberg, a terrorist mobility expert from the 9/11 Commission Staff, sees terrorists as much more likely to make illegal use of legal travel routes (e.g., air or land ports of entry) than illegal entry outside such routes.  She prioritizes security measures at legal movement channels and immigration reform solutions combined with monitoring technology to protect outside perimeters.[v]

(c) Walls do not have a good record as counter-terrorism measures.

A RAND corporation study of the Israeli wall on the West Bank found that it was often bypassed by tunnels, specialized ladders, and use of legal channels (checkpoints).[vi]

Static, non-adaptive approaches to security technologies face degradation because of the “action-reaction” dynamic between security technologies and their adversaries; case studies show that terrorists have changed their operational practices in ways that make the defenses less effective.[vii]

(d) Comprehensive immigration reform will go a long way to taking the immigration-terrorism connection off the table, and will free border security to focus on the truly bad guys.

Intensive border enforcement of immigration laws actually has perverse, negative effects on border enforcement against terrorism.  It strengthens and hardens smuggling organizations.  It creates an enormous workload of minor law violators, distracting border officers from identifying small numbers of specific high risk individuals and creating actionable intelligence about terrorist mobility.  It alienates immigrant communities from authorities, removing an important source of intelligence against terrorists.  Terrorists may hide among minor immigration law violators.  Mass immigration enforcement is tactically very different from counterterrorism, and may well act as a distraction of attention and diversion of resources. Comprehensive immigration reform is a suitable alternative to these serious limitations in current policy.[viii]

(e) Maintaining good relations with Mexico is an important component of an effective homeland security strategy.

The Mexican government has a good record of keeping potential terrorists from entering that country (e.g., through Mexican airports), which is why no Islamic terrorists have been documented entering from Mexico.[ix]

(2) There are a number of compelling alternative priorities for the huge funds thart the border wall will require over its life cycle.[x]

(a) The border wall may cost $11.48 to $49.00 billion over a twenty five year life cycle, accounting not only for construction but also maintenance and repair costs (in 2005 dollars).[xi]

(b) Greater funding of land border ports of entry is a compelling need, both in terms of their high priority in risk management approaches to limiting terrorist mobility[xii] and extensively documented shortfalls in their performance.

The GAO has found serious weaknesses in travel inspection processes, including lack of staff, shortfalls in training, and limits to physical infrastructure.  Customs and Border Protection need several thousand more inspectors at Ports of Entry to fulfill their staffing model.  Overwhelmed inspectors suffer from morale problems and fatigue.  Because of staffing shortfalls, inspectors cannot be pulled out of the line to receive counterterrorism training.  The result is that GAO inspectors found inconsistent and even lacking inspections at ports.[xiii]

(c) Major improvements in the issuance of visas and the tracking of visa overstays need to be funded, considering the ways the 9/11 hijackers entered and the likely sources of risks (e.g., travel from Europe).

The Visa Waiver Program, a substantial risk channel, can benefit from investments in improved monitoring.[xiv] The International Advisory Program, which places DHS officers at international airports to check high risk travelers, is only temporary; it needs to be funded permanently.[xv] The exit component of US-VISIT has not been implemented at land ports; this major flaw in border security needs long-term investments in workable solutions that do not obstruct legitimate movement.[xvi]

(d) Passenger and freight rail are deserve substantially more resources than the border wall, given the explicit knowledge we have of their vulnerability from the London and Madrid attacks (among others).

The vast, easily accessible, vital, and humanly vulnerable passenger rail and mass transit systems of the country are woefully underprotected.  The freight rail system is more controlled, but involves frequent movement of hazardous substances through inhabited areas.[xvii]

(e) Maritime security needs more funding, as does overall supply chain security.

The number one concern of security experts in the Terrorism Index was maritime security.  The vast volume of cargo entering U.S. borders from all over the world, and the economic and human vulnerability of large metropolitan ports, places this high in the list of risk management.  An initial program of risk management, the Container Security Initiative, shows promise, but it needs funding to extend its operations from the most secure ports in the world (where it currently operates) to the smaller ports in high risk nations that actually pose the highest risks as sources of terrorist actions.  While 100% physical inspection of containers is inefficient, only 5% of containers are now physically inspected, and higher funding could produce a more thorough and meaningful inspections program.[xviii]

(f) Air cargo security needs more funding.

Similarly, air cargo security, including cargo placed on passenger airplanes, does not receive complete screening because of funding shortfalls, and represents an important priority in a comprehensive risk management system.[xix]

(g) Many other risks can be cited that involve higher priorities than the wall.

An interesting example is cyber-terrorism, and cyber-attacks generally, which do not need to cross border barriers at all.  Cyber-attacks do not just include disrupting the internet; much greater risks come from hacking into computer controlled high importance or high danger systems, such as computer controlled energy production and grids, chemical plants (including water treatment plants), and so forth.[xx]

(3) The border wall is a failed approach to law enforcement against violent crime and smuggling organizations coming over from Mexico.

(a) The risk is that the border wall will make more profits for larger and more sophisticated smuggling organizations with the ability to get over, under, or around it--that is, that the wall in combination with a limited, incomplete legal migration policy will “harden” the smugglers.[xxi]

(b) An important priority is deterring illicit travel networks from providing services to terrorists; taking the profit out of high skill smuggling and directed law enforcement approaches are called for.[xxii]

(c) Involvement of immigrant communities, rather than offending them or making them hide from authorities, is central to effective law enforcement[xxiii] and to the isolation of terrorists, violent criminals, and smuggling organizations. Several dangerous terrorist conspiracies in the U.S. have been halted by members of immigrant communities coming forward in confidence to police.[xxiv]

(d) Effective law enforcement approaches exist on the U.S.-Mexico border that have deterred violent crime crossing over from Mexico, without the wall having been built.[xxv]

Better use of resources will result in more effective protection of civilian lives and quality of life, while at the same time guarding against human rights violations at the border.

Sources for previous screen:

[i] Josiah Heyman, Ph.D., is a long established expert on border issues and Professor at the University of Texas at El Paso [for identification purposes only]; among his recent works is Josiah McC. Heyman and Jason Ackleson, “U.S. Border Security after September 11,” forthcoming in Transforming Borders in the Al Qaeda Era, eds. John A. Winterdyk and Kelly W. Sundberg (London: Ashgate, 2009), available as a working paper at http://frontier.k-state.edu/ResearchAndAnalysis/Publications/US-BorderAfter9-11%208-15pre-publicationDraft.pdf.

[i] Government Accountability Office [GAO], “Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions,” Report GAO-07-454, August 17, 2007, at p. 2 of summary statement, accessed at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07454.pdf; Michael A. Wermuth and K. Jack Riley [RAND Corporation], “The Strategic Challenge of Border Security,” March 8, 2007, at p. 3, accessed at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT275.pdf.

[ii] P.J. Crowley, “Safe at Home: A National Security Strategy to Protect the American Homeland, the Real Central Front,” Center for American Progress, February 25, 2008, at p. 13 & 56-57, accessed at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/02/pdf/safe_at_home.pdf.

[iii] Conducted by the Center for American Progress, balanced for partisan leanings, dated June 14, 2006, Question 11, p.11, accessed at http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/terrorsurveypoll.pdf.

[iv] Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism and Immigration: An Initial Exploration,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 18(4) December 2006, pp. 503 - 521.

[v] Susan Ginsburg, “Countering Terrorist Mobility: Shaping an Operational Strategy,” Feb. 2006, esp. at pp. 70-79, accessed at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI_TaskForce_Ginsburg.pdf.

[vi] Brian A. Jackson, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Bruce Newsome, John V. Parachini, William Rosenau, Erin M. Simpson, Melanie W. Sisson, & Donald Temple [RAND Corporation], “Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding Terrorist Efforts to Overcome Defensive Technologies,” 2007, at pp. 30-34, accessed at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG481.pdf.

[vii] Brian A. Jackson [RAND Corporation], “Developing Robust Border Security Technologies to Protect Against Diverse and Adaptive Threats,” Nov. 15, 2007, at pp. 2-4, accessed at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT294.pdf.

[viii] Donald Kerwin and Margaret D. Stock, "National Security and Immigration Policy: Reclaiming Terms, Measuring Success, and Setting Priorities" U.S. Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center, updated version July 2007, accessed at http://www.cliniclegal.org/Publications/ArticlesbyCLINIC/National_Security_and_Immigration_PolicyUPDATED.pdf; Coalition for Immigration Security [statement], July 20, 2006, accessed at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=20069; P.J. Crowley, op. cit.; Ginsburg op. cit.

[ix] Jason Ackleson, “Achieving 'Security and Prosperity': Migration and North American Economic Integration,” Feb. 2006, at pp. 1, 5, accessed at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/images/File/infocus/Security%20and%20Prosperity.pdf.

[x] For an overall vision of budgetary priorities for Homeland Security, following risk management principles, see P.J. Crowley, op. cit. at p. 72 ff.

[xi] Calculated from Blas Nuñez-Neto and Yule Kim, “Border Security: Barriers Along the U.S. International Border,” May 13, 2008, Congressional Research Service Report RL 33659, at p. 33, accessed at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33659.pdf.

[xii] See Ginsburg’s discussion of the high risk of terrorist movement through legal entrances, and the importance of such locations both in interdicting terrorists and also gaining intelligence about their organizations and methods of movement. Susan Ginsburg, op. cit. at pp. 70-79.

[xiii] GAO, “Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry,” Report GAO-08-219, November 5, 2007, accessed at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08219.pdf.  Also see, on the need for funding time off the line in order to train in counterterrorism, Donald Kerwin and Margaret D. Stock, op. cit.

[xiv] GAO, “Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry,” Report GAO-08-219, November 5, 2007, at p. 17, accessed at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08219.pdf; Government Accountability Office [GAO], “Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions,” Report GAO-07-454, August 17, 2007, at p. 44, accessed at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07454.pdf.

[xv] GAO, “Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions,” Report GAO-07-454, August 17, 2007, at p. 44, accessed at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07454.pdf.

[xvi] GAO, “Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry,” Report GAO-07-248, December 6, 2006, accessed at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07248.pdf; GAO, “Homeland Security: Strategic Solution for US-VISIT Program Needs to Be Better Defined, Justified, and Coordinated,” Report GAO-08-361, February 29, 2008, accessed at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08361.pdf; also see Donald Kerwin and Margaret D. Stock, op. cit. at pp. 395-398.

[xvii] [RAND Corporation] “A Framework for Planning Cost-Effective Rail Security Against a Terrorist Attack,” 2007, accessed at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2007/RAND_RB9309.pdf; Jeremy M. Wilson, Brian A. Jackson, Mel Eisman, Paul Steinberg, and K. Jack Riley [RAND Corporation], “Securing America’s Passenger-Rail Systems, 2007, accessed at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG705/; K. Jack Riley, “Terrorism and Rail Security,” March 2004, accessed at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/RAND_CT224.pdf; P.J. Crowley, op. cit. at p. 50.

[xviii] Terrorism Index, June 14, 2006, Question 11, p.11, accessed at http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/terrorsurveypoll.pdf; Michael D. Greenberg, Peter Chalk, Henry H. Willis, Ivan Khilko, David S. Ortiz [RAND Corporation], “Maritime Terrorism Risk and Liability,” 2006, accessed at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG520.pdf; Jon D. Haveman, Ethan M. Jennings, Howard J. Shatz, & Greg C. Wright, “The Container Security Initiative and Ocean Container Threats,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management Vol. 4 (2007), Issue 1, Article 1, accessed at http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol4/iss1/1; Susan Martonosi, David S. Ortiz, and Henry H. Willis, “Evaluating the viability of 100 per cent container inspection at America’s ports”, in The Economic Impacts of Terrorist Attacks,  H. W. Richardson, P. Gordon, J. E. Moore II (eds.). Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005; Henry H. Willis, David S. Ortiz [RAND Corporation], “Evaluating the Security of the Global Containerized Supply Chain,” 2004, accessed at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2004/RAND_TR214.pdf; P.J. Crowley, op. cit. at pp. 19, 49.

[xix] P.J. Crowley, op. cit., at p. 46.

[xx] Marten van Heuven, Maarten Botterman, Stephan De Spiegeleire [RAND Europe], “Managing New Issues: Cyber Security in an Era of Technological Change,” accessed at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1535.pdf; P.J. Crowley, op. cit. at p. 45.

[xxi] Susan Ginsburg, op. cit. at pp. 73-76; Donald Kerwin and Margaret D. Stock, op. cit. at p. 406.

[xxii] Susan Ginsburg, op. cit. at pp. 51-53.

[xxiii] Major Cities Chiefs, “M.C.C. Immigration Committee Recommendations for Enforcement of Immigration Laws by Local Agencies,” June 2006, at pp. 5-6, accessed at http://www.houstontx.gov/police/pdfs/mcc_position.pdf; International Association of Chiefs of Police, “Police Chiefs Guide to Immigration Issues,” July 2007, at pp. 21-22, accessed at  http://www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/Publications/PoliceChiefsGuidetoImmigration.pdf.

[xxiv] Donald Kerwin and Margaret D. Stock, op. cit.; Coalition for Immigration Security [statement], July 20, 2006, accessed at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=20069; Susan Ginsburg, op. cit.

[xxv] Sen. Eliot Shapleigh, Lifting the Lamp Beside Texas’ Door: Addressing the Challenges and Opportunities of Immigration in Texas for the 2007-2009 Biennium, Austin and El Paso: Office of Senator Eliot Shapleigh, at pp. 36-38.